In dispute between the two in 1982.

In the past few decades, the use of economic sanctions has increased substantially and
sanctions have become the foreign policy tool of choice for many countries. In theory, the
way sanctions work is simple; sanctioned countries (called targets) su§er costs resulting
from actions taken by the sanctioning countries (called senders). In order to avoid the
costs, targets modify their behavior in the direction desired by the senders. Very often, the
current behavior of targets does not seem to change in the direction desired by the senders.
Thus, many scholars believe that sanctions are used mostly for sending messages to the
international community and for deterring certain behaviors. The intuition of this paper
is that countries perceive economic sanctions as signals of disapproval and expect senders
to impose more sanctions on countries that repeat the targetís ìo§ense.î Thus, countries
are less likely to repeat the ìo§enseî because they try to avoid the costs associated with
economic sanctions. This paper investigates whether sanctioning a country involved in a
militarized dispute makes the sanctioned country less likely to participate in other disputes
in the future.
At a Örst glance, data seems to support the deterrence hypothesis. Figure 1 shows the
number of disputes in which India participated before and after a military dispute with
Pakistan in 1971 (the Örst two bars), the number of disputes in which Pakistan participated
before and after the same dispute (the third and fourth bars). The next four bars show the
before and after number of disputes in which India and Pakistan participated before and
after another dispute between the two in 1982. Both India and Pakistan were sanctioned
because of their participation in the 1971 dispute, but no economic action was taken in
the 1982 dispute. The Örst four bars shows that India and Pakistan participated in less
disputes in the Öve years following the sanctioned dispute than in the Öve years before it.
The last four bars show that the same countries participated in more conáicts in the Öve
1
years after the dispute that was not sanctioned than in the Öve years before it.
The idea that sanctions are meant to express disapproval and deter is not new. Galtung
(1967) is one of the Örst authors to point out that sanctions are a way of communication
between countries and that senders express disapproval of targetsíactions. Chan (2000)
expands this idea and states that sanctions act as signals to other countries who might
behave similarly to the target. Lindsay (1986) believes that the four possible objectives of
economic sanctions are compliance, subversion, domestic symbolism, deterrence and international
symbolism (sending messages to the international community). This paper tests
whether economic sanctions imposed on a country involved in a militarized dispute deters
future militarized actions by showing disapproval of militarized disputes and willingness to
ináict costs.
There are many papers that predict militarized conáicts. Choi et al. (2006), Dixon
(1994), Fearon (1994), Mousseau (1998), Oneal et al. (1996), (1997), and (2003) and
Raymond (1994) believe that democratic countries are less likely to engage in international
conáicts. This study also includes democracy as one factor that predicts future conáicts.
Russett et al. (1998) adds relative military capabilities as a determinant of militarized
disputes. This paper also controls for military capabilities measured as military personnel.
Nordhaus et al. (2006) estimate that the probability of a militarized conáict between two
countries is a function of the number of years they were at peace and of other variables.
This study also controls for the countryís belligerence by adding in the analysis the number
of militarized disputes in which the country was involved in previous years and the level of
violence reached in previous disputes. Unlike previous studies, this one considers the e§ect
of previous disputeís fatalities on the outbreak of future disputes.

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